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FollowingPhillip's originalwork on the UK, applied research onunemploymentand
wages has been dominated by the analysis of highly aggregated time-seriesdata sets. However,
it hasproved difficult with such methods to uncover statistically reliable models. This paper
adopts a different approach. It uses microeconomic data on 175,000 British workers from 1973-
1990 to provide evidence for the existence of a negatively sloped relationship linking the level
of pay to the local rate of unemployment. This 'wage curve' is found to have an elasticity of
approximately -01. Conuaiy to the Phillips Curve, no autoregression is found in wages. The
paper casts doubt on standard ideas in macroeconomics, regional economics and labour
economics.
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ENGLANDEstimating a Wage Curve for Britain 1973-1990
Althoughthe question 'How does unemployment affect paydetermination'?' is one of the
mostintensivelydebatedissuesineconomics, there continuestobe relatively little
agreement about the answer.Following Phillips's (1958)work, research inthisfieldhas
been dominated by time-series analysis of highlyaggregateddata sets. However, ithas
proved difficultwith suchmethods to uncover statisticallyreliablemodels.While
macroeconomics textbooks contineto use the PhillipsCurveas a centrepiece, thequalityof
the supporting empirical evidence isnothigh.
Theobject of thispaper is touse microeconomicdataonasampleof approximately
175,000British workersfrom the1970s to the 1990s to provide evidence forthe existence
ofa negatively slopedcurvelinkingthekd of pay to the rate oflocalunemployment1.
This spatialrelationship,christeneda 'wage curve' by Blanchflowerand Oswald(1990),
differsfrom Phillips's relationship. Italso differsfrom theconventionalwisdomandlarge
literaturestemmingfrom Harris andTodaro (1970)and Hall (1970). Thatliteratureasserts
that, by a compensating-differentials argument,wages and unemployment must be
positivelycorrelated acrossregions.
Later results touch upon the three fieldsofmacroeconomics,regional economics
andlabour economics.Although thepaperisprimarilyconcernedto document a statistical
relationship, the Appendixsets out a theoreticalmodel,asanillustration and one possible
interpretation ofthe data, in which a negativeassociation betweenwages and
unemploymentemerges. Itis a multi-regional framework extending researchthatderives
theoretical wage-setting curves in aggregate models. This work includes Akerlof and
Yellen (1990), Bowles (1985), Carlinand Soskice(1990), Layard and Nickell(1986)2.
Lindbeck(1992),Phelps (1990. 1992), Rowthorn (1977). Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
andunpublishedlectures given by David Soskice at Oxford University in the l970s. In a
recent review article, Woodford (1992) pointsoutthat the central and distinguishing2
theoretical feature of this new family of macroeconomic models is the idea that there exists
a negatively sloped curve tying the level of pay to the rate of unemployment. A necessary
(though not sufficient) condition for such models to be believable is that there be empirical
evidence, preferably of a kind easily replicated by other investigators, for the existence of
such a curve.
I. Outline
Later sections estimate weekly earnings equations3 in which, along with
conventional control variables for personal characteristics, local unemployment is included
as an independent variable. The unemployment variable enters with a negative coefficient
and an elasticity close to -0.1.Hence,according to these data, a doubling of
unemployment is associated statistically with a drop of one tenth inwages. One
interpretation of this unemployment elasticity of pay is that it provides a measure of the
degree of wage responsiveness in the labour market. Section 11 of thepaper describes the
main results and discusses a variety of econometric specifications.
There are a number of questions that can be raised about this approach, and the
paper tries to address them in turn.
1. Fixed effects A weakness of earlier estimates in, forexample, Blanchflower and
Oswald (1990) is that, because of the lack of a sufficient longitudinalelement, it was not
possible there to allow properly for regional fixed effects. This paper's use ofa pooled
OHS data set makes it possible to include these. Thecomparatively long time period also
provides an opportunity to check whether the British wage curve holds ina convincingly
stable way across sub-samples of differentyears.
2. Labour supply It could be that unemployment isacting as a form of aggregate labour
supply variable. On this view, the correct interpretation of thewage curve is as a mis-
measured labour supply curve. Such an objection is potentially important because it throws
into doubt the main component, and novel feature, of thenon-competitive models
discussed above. This objection, which would be difficultto test convincingly with3
aggregate time-series data, is checked in Section III by including a local labour force
participation variable instead of the unemployment rate.
3. Harris-Todaro and simultaneity Some commentators have argued that unemployment
and pay are determined by the interaction of a negatively sloped wage curve with a
positively sloped Harris-Todaro (1970) or HaIl (1970) zero-migration condition, and that
this creates simultaneity bias. Although that is likely to be true in estimation using a single
cross-section, it is less serious when longitudinal data are available. Assuming that
migration is costly, and so chosen on the basis of long run views about the desirability of
living in different regions, the Harris-Todaro condition requires, as the Appendix shows,
that it is permanent unemployment and permanent wages that are positively associated. A
regression that includes a set of regional dummies is equivalent to estimating deviations
from long run means, and has thus been purged of the effect of a zero-migration equation
defined on unchanging regional means. This argument may be less applicable in a countxy
undergoing dramatic spatial restructuring, but Great Britain, with little inter-regional net
migration4, is not of that type.
4. Labour demand A further possible source of simultaneity is through labour demand
responses: current regional wages may affect the current unemployment rates in regions.
Perhaps because of a perception that this effect is likely to be small (apparently confirmed
in US data by the instrumenting in Blanchard and Katz (1992)), the existing literature has
largely ignored the potential problem. This paper examines whether instrumenting
unemployment with lagged values of itself leaves the results unchanged, which, given the
lack of other instruments, is probably the best that can be done. If any simultaneity bias
remains, it will tend to make it harder to obtain a negatively sloped wage curve.
5. Hourly wages Most previous work studies annual or weekly earnings rather than
wages. The use of weeldy earnings, rather than what might be considered a preferable
form of hourly wage variable, is also necessitated here by the lack in the GHS of hourly
wage data over most of the period. To check whether this is a problem, however,the same4
framework is estimated over a sub-sample for which an hourly pay series can be calculated,
and the findingsaxecompared withthose from weeklyearnings equations.
6. Group errors Early British estimates of the effect of regional unemployment, insources
such as Blackaby and Manning (1987) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1990), defined
unemployment at a highly aggregated level and the dependent wage variable at a
rnicroeconomic level. Moulton (1986, 1987, 1990) has pointed out that in such estimation
the t-statistics are likely to be biased upwards by commongroup errors. Section III of the
paper corrects for this by estimating regressions on cell means.
The paper uses General Household Survey data to pool a series of individualcross-
section samples from 1973 to 1990. This pr.ocess provides informationon a sample of
approximately 175,000 employees in Great Britain. The availability of the General
Household Survey series means that it is possible to derive for the first timea consistent
series of data for Britain through the interesting decades of the 1970s and 1980s.Pooling
raises a number of issues about consistency over the period. Therewere changes in the
design of the survey over time, in the wording and coding ofmany of the relevant
questions, and in both the occupational and industry classifications. A detailedsummary of
the merging of the data is provided in aseparate technical appendix that is available from
the authors. It is not possible to obtain a consistent serieson hours in all of the years of
data, but that can be done for a sub-sample.
For the years 1973-1977, respondents were asked toreport both their earnings over
the preceding twelve months and the number of weeksworked. In each survey after 1977
the following questions were asked ofemployees:
a) On what date were you last paid a wage or a salary?
b) How long a period did your last wage/salary cover?
c) What was your gross pay last time beforeany deductions were made?
These questions were used to construct thedependent variable: log weekly earnings. To
control for a change in the nature of theearnings question in 1978 and onwards, a series of5
eleven interaction terms were included in the regressions. These were interacted with each
of the regional dummy variables with a dummy variable set to one if the data were taken
from a survey prior to 1978 and to zero otherwise.
For the years 1973-1986, the GHS was conducted in every month of the calendar
year. Since 1987 the survey has beenconducted during the financial year April to March:
hence the 1987 and subsequent surveys contain nine monthly interviews in 1987 and three
in 1988. Consequently, the later regressions include both month and year-of-interview
dummies, as well as controls for gender, race, years of schooling, experience and its
square, marital status, part-time, highest qualifications,and industry (for work on
inequality using the same data, see Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower, 1992). The total
sample is approximately one third of a million, which provides 175,946 employees with
wage data. This means that, on average, there are approximately10.000 observations per
year. However, as can be seen below, sample sizes werereduced from 1982 onwards.





















Thesmall sample size in 1990 is due to the fact That 1990 information is available only for
themonths January toMarch of 1990.
The modeldescribedinthe Appendiximpliesthat movements inlocal
unemployment should produce movements in the opposite direction in local wages, that is.
that a negatively sloped wage curve should exist. The remainder of the section examines
this empirically and summarizes wage curves estimated over the period 1973-1990.
II. Wage Equations
In the initial regressions, the dependent variable is the log of weekly earnings5.
Unemployment rates were mapped in at the level of the standard region for the year of the
interview, to give observations on 11 regions by 18 years. Table 1 reports the first results
from estimating a log earnings equation for the periods 1973- 1980, 1981-1990, and for the
entire period 1973-1990. In each case, Table l's results are provided with and without
controls for regional fixed effects. Little evidence could be found for any effect from a
long-term unemployment variable or for highly non-linear unemployment terms, so these
are omitted. Year dummies and personal controls are always included.
The main finding in Table 1 is that there is a well-defined unemployment effect.
In the key columns 2, 4 and 6, where regional dummies are in each case incorporated, the
unemployment elasticity of pay estimated using these data is fractionally below -0. 1. It is
approximately the same in the two sub-periods (-0.09 and -0.07 respectively), and -0.08
overall. Therefore, there appears to be a wage curve, and it is stable across these periods.
The addition of the region dummies turns out to reduce the absolute size of the coefficient
on the log of the unemployment rate, but to make comparatively little difference to the
findings.
These data provide an opportunity to examine for the first time the relative
responsiveness of different groups' wages --controllingfor fixed effects --toregional
unemployment. The unemployment rate used for the regressions is that for all workers
(not just that for the particular group of workers). Table 2 gives disaggregatedwage curve7
estimates after controlling for region-specific fixed effects. The pay of blacks is
dramatically sensitive to local unemployment: the unemployment elasticity in this case is
approximately -0.22. The pay levels of construction workers, the young, and the least
experienced also seem to be more flexible (than the average) to changes in the
unemployment rate. These findings mean that secularly rising unemployment in an
economy will tend to raise inequality by depressing most intensely the wages of some of
the most vulnerable groups.
For brevity, the coefficients on the other control variables in Table 2 are not given.
However, because these pooled OHS regression results are not available elsewhere, Tables
3 and 4 report a limited selection of coefficients. Table 3 provides estimates for males.
females and blacks. For example, consistent with Greenhalgh (1980). being mathd
means higher male earnings but lower female earnings. The rate of return to an additional
year of schooling is higher for men than it is for women, whereas the return to a college
qualification (e.g. degree, HND or a teaching diploma) is higher for women. Black men
appear to earn nearly 15% less, ceteris paribus, than white men; black females do not
appear to earn less than white females. ceteris paribus. Male experience-earnings profiles
are steeper than for females. Both male and female earnings reach their maximum after
approximately 30 years of experience. Apprenticeships appear to convey substantial
benefits to men but none for women, which is consistent with findings in Blanchflower
and Lynch (1994).
The estimates in Tables 1-3 impose the assumption that unemployment enters in
a log-linear way. To examine the association between unemployment and wages without
making assumptions about functional form, Table 4 reports the results of estimating an
unrestricted specification. The distribution of unemployment rates is split into 5%
segmentsof approximately equal size (in terms of numbers of individuals in each cell).
This allows the inclusion of 19 separate dummy variables --onefor each twentieth part of
the unemployment axis --andthus produces a non-parametric way of incorporating an8
unemployment variable. Once again the standard control variables discussed above are
included, along with a set of tegion dummies.
Again consistent with the existence of a wage curve, eighteen of the nineteen
dummies are significant, and all lie approximately on a negatively sloped line. As the
unemployment rate rises, the drop in the size of the coefficient tends to fall. In Figure Ia
the antilogs of the coefficients are plotted against the mid-point of therange of
unemployment rates given in Table 3. There is strong evidence of a downward slope and a
little of convexity. Figure lb reveals that a second-order polynomial of the following form
seems to fit the data reasonably well (R2=.979). The exact functional form, which
minimizes at an unemployment rate equal to 20%, is: w =1.0263-.023440+.0005902
HI. Checks and Experiments
The previous literature has ignored the econometric aggregation problems pointed
out by Moulton (1986), which will lead to an inflated estimate of the significance ofany
aggregated variable such as local unemployment. One way to correct for this is to ensure
that the levels of aggregation are the same on each side of thewage equation. Table 5 thus
makes use of data for each year aggregated into cell means (for all variables)across the
eleven standatd regions of Britain. This gives a total of 198 cells (18years by 11 regions).
Data on the 175,000 individuals were used to create regioniyearaverages for, for example,
each of the personal characteristics. A form of panel, for theseregions, was thereby
created.
Column 1 of the Table includes the log of the currentyear unemployment rate
without any controls for region fixed effects; it has a coefficient of -0.04. The addition of
the region dummies in column 2 then produces, once again,a well-defined wage curve
(with a coefficient of -0.1 and a t-statistic of 3.7). This seems tosupport the idea thai,
perhaps for Harris-Toijaro reasons, omission of region-specific fixed effects leads to
downward bias of the unemployment elasticity ofpay. The principal conclusion, however,9
isthat estimating regressions on cell-means leaves unchanged the earlier estimates of the
unemployment elasticity.
Table 5's estimation on cell means means that wage dynamics can also be studied.
This might be thoughtofas a microeconometric descendant of Sargan's work (1964), who
may have been the first to consider the Phillips Curve as an adjustment mechanism around
a long run relationship between the level of pay and the level of unemployment. However,
the results are probably not what most macroeconomists would expect. No support
statistically can be found, with a full set of region dummies incorporated (columns 4-6 of
Table 5),forthe inclusion of a lagged dependent variable or a lag on the unemployment
rate. The coefficient on the log of last period's wage is approximately 0.07 with a t-statistic
of unity. This contrasts with most time-series estimation, and with a regression using
pooled cross-sections that is reported on page 314 of Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991)
in which, without any control variables, the lagged dependent variable in a British wage
equation has a coefficient of 0.4.
Despite the prominence given to the Phillips Curve in macroeconomics texbooks,
the traditional autoregression of wage levels that has been found in many decades of
empirical studies may be due to the omission of variables and to aggregation error, rather
than be a true reflection of the nature of wage determination. A well-known problem with
time-series modelling is that aggregate variables routinely look close to random walks.
Macroeconomic wage equations could be spuriously generating a lagged dependent variable
with a coefficient close to unity, and thereby producing a correlation that would have the
appearance of a wage change specification. Inflation would then intrude by mistake into an
analysis of the determinants of the level of pay. Perhaps this is what lies at the heart of
Phillips (1958).
Although the inclusion here of year and regional dummies capture a multitude of
unknown forces, and the modelling should be thought of as in deviations from means, the
results in the paper are consistent with the view that within regions there is nothing that10
could usefully be thought of as a Phillips relationship. In the far right columns of Table 5,
thecoefficient on the lagged dependent variable is zero. This raises the possibility that the
Phillips Curve is an error of interpretation that would not have arisen if previous
researchers had been able to use micro data6.
Is the correlation between pay and unemployment in the paper's Tables merely a
misspecified kind of conventional neoclassical supply curve? This isa likely reaction from
someone who views the labour market as usefully described by the competitive model. As
a check, Table 6 experiments with specifications that include the participation (or 'activity')
rate. These use the OHS data files to generate aggregate participation rates, across the
regions, for individuals in the age range 16-70. Table 6's results are not favourable to the
idea that the wage curve is simply a poorly identified labour supply function. The
participation rate, whether measured as a level or as a log, is alwaysinsignificantly
different from zero, and has the wrong sign. The local unemployment variable dominates
it. Experimentation confirmed this conclusion and so casts doubton the view that the wage
curve is merely a mis-measured supply curve. It is then not easy to see how thewage
curve's existence could be explained by competitive theory.
The estimate of an unemployment elasticity ofpay of close to -0.10. obtained in
Table 5inthe presence of a full set of area-specific fixed effects, is similar to theaggregate
time-series estimates for Great Britain of Layard and Nickell(1986), the micro-based
estimates of Blackaby and Manning (1987. 1990) andBlackaby, Bladen-Hovell and
Syrnons (1990), and the regional-level estimates of Jackman, Layard and Savouri(1991).
The estimates are consistent with the ideasuggested some years ago that the unemployment
elasticity of real wages in Britain is close to -0.1 (Oswald 1986,p. 190).
An objection to the findings is that most models, including that in theAppendix.
focus upon the wage and not earnings. Table 7 re-estimateson a sub-sample from 1973-
1977 in order to test the implications ofswitching to hourly earnings as the dependent
variable. It limits the analysis to a data fileconsisting of slightly over 60.000 individuals11
who were employees at the date of interview and who reported their gross weekly
earnings, including wages, salary, tips, bonus, and commission, for the preceding twelve
months. Interviews were spread across the twelve months of the year, so all equations
include 11 month dummies and 4 year dummies, in addition to a vector of industry,
occupation, region and qualification dummies and a set of personal controls.
Unemployment rates were again mapped in at the level of the standard region for the year
of the interview.
Table 7 reports the results of estimating a weekly earnings equation using this
1973-1977 sub-sample. In column 1, the log of the unemployment rate has a coefficient of
-0.07 with a t-statistic of over 10. The addition of a full set of regional dummies in column
2 changes the size of the coefficient only slightly to -0.09: the coefficient remains
significant with a t-statistic of just under S. The data did not support the inclusion of higher
order unemployment terms, such as the cube of the logarithm. There is little to choose
statistically between the log or the level of unemployment. For ease of exposition, and
following Layard and Nickel! (1986) and Nickell (1987) on aggregate data, only the results
with the log of the unemployment rate are given.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, the dependent variable is re-defined as hourly
earnings, that is, as total earnings in the previous year divided by (usual weeks *usual
weekly hours), It is noteworthy that the estimated unemployment elasticities of pay are
similar in the two halves of the Table. For example, in columns 2 and 4 of Table 7, the
estimated unemployment elasticity of pay is approximately -0.09. Therefore, switching to
an hourly wage variable apparently makes no difference to the conclusions of the paper.
Finally, columns 1-4 of Table 5 were re-estimated instrumenting the.
unemployment variable by various combinations of itself lagged (results not reported). The
unemployment elasticity of pay continued, across a range of specifications, to be just below
-0.1. The use of simple lagged unemployment variables is less than ideal, but data on
exogenous regional demand variables axe not available. The outcome here is consistent with12
the general finding reported in Blauchflower and Oswald (1994b) --drawingupon US data
--thatinstrumenting the unemployment rate does not materially affect these kinds of
econometric results. Mother indication is that the unemployment elasticity of pay is
apparently close to -0.1 regardless of which data set or sample period is studied.
IV. Conclusions
This paper uses pooled data on approximately 175.000 workers from the General
Household Surveys of 1973-1990 to explore the effect of unemployment upon pay. It
argues that there exists a negatively sloped 'wage curve in Great Britain. The paper is
apparently the first to show that, after controlling for workers' personal characteristics and
regional fixed effects, them is an inverse relationship between the level of Britons' pay and
the local unemployment rate. The estimated unemployment elasticity of wages7. is
approximately -0.1,so that a doubling of local unemployment is associated with a fall of
one tenth in the level of workers' remuneration. No autoregression in wages is found. In
other words, the lagged dependent variable in a wage-level equation is zero. This raises the
possibility that the use of macroeconomic data has set a large earlier literature off on the
wrong path.
The paper's results seem to shed doubt on textbook ideas in macroeconomics,
regional economics and labour economics. They axe not easily reconciled with the Phillips
Curve, nor with the literature built around Harris and Todaro (1970), nor with the
competitive model of the labour market. One interpretation of the paper is that it provides
microeconomethc evidence for the wage-setting relationship that is the central theoretical
assumption of papers such as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Layard and Nickell (1986), and
Phelps (1990). These papers are important because theyargue that the traditional.
neoclassical demand-and-supply framework is fundamentally thewrong way to think about
the labour market. It is likely that the future willproduce other, and perhaps better,
explanations for the wage curve.13
The empirical findings seem to be robust to changes in the sample and the exact
procedures used. Estimation over the sub-sample period 1973-1980, for example, yields a
wage curve withanelasticity of -0.07. Over the historically rather different sub-sample of
1981-1990, a similar elasticity, -0.09, is found. Thus it is possible to discard a decade ol
data, re-estimate on the eighty thousand observations that remain, and obtain the key
finding almost unchanged. Such constancy is unusual in econometric work. The empirical
results also appear to be robust to alterations in the nature of the dependent variable, to a
switch to cell means in response to Moulton's (1986) critique, to the instrumenting of the
unemployment variable (though this can be done only in a crude way), to the inclusion of a
labour force participation variable, and to disaggregation into categories such as race, skill
and gender.14
- Endnotes
1. The form of this wage curve' is consistent with newly emerging estimates from other
nations' data sets. The role of local unemployment is studied in, for example,
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994b), Christofides and Oswald (1992), Edin s.s1
(1994), Freeman (1990), Groot g..4 (1992), Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) using
industry data, Katz and Krueger (1991a, 199lb), and Montgomery (1993). Topel (1986)
does not examine the effect of the local unemployment rate upon pay, but does study the
impact of individual unemployment risk and of regional employment growth.
2. The only one of these to provide empirical evidence to back up their theoretical analysis
is the paper by Layard and Nickell (1986).
3. Early work, on smaller British data sets, is reported in Blackaby and Manning (1987,
1990), Blanchflower (1991), Blanchflower tA (1990), and Blanchflower and Oswald
(1990). These rely almost exclusively on single cross-sections and are unable, therefore.
to control fully for fixed effects.
4. By way of example, UK Regional Trends shows that in 1989 among those aged 15-44
only 4000 net people moved from or to the South-East. The total population of the South-
East is more than 17 million.
5.Itmight be argued that regional price deflators should be used to create real wages. The
paper uses nominal wage data, and includes both regional fixed effects and year dummies
to control for price levels, which should obviate most of the problem. Blanchflower et al
(1990) finds a wage curve with an elasticity of -0.1 in a single cross-section with
aggregated regional dummies, so the phenomenon itself is probably not due to omitted
regional price levels. Moreover, if local prices (and house prices) are a multiple of wages,
theycan besubstitued out of a wage equation to leave the form used here. Finally,
Blackaby and Manning (1990) show in other data that an unemployment term is robust to
the inclusion of house prices, and, consistent with the view that the unemployment effect is
not the result of omitted regional price effects, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994b) report an
industry wage curve with an unemployment elasticity of approximately -0.1.
6. A defence of Phillips Curve methodology has been provided recently by Manning
(1993). He argues, among other things, that wage-level equations are not identified
(because they might be inverted labour demand curves), and that in a microeconometric
version of such wage equations the lagged dependent variable need not be unity (because
its coefficient and that on an aggregate alternative wage should sum to unity). One defence,
though open to objections, is that if unemployment is in a econometric sense pre-
determined, the former will not in practice be a problem. On Manning's second point, the
inclusion of year dummies in Tables 5and6 will presumably pick up the influence of the
alternative wage, and it is not clear how he would react to our finding that the lagged
dependent variable is literally zero.
7. This is close to the estimates recently documented for nine other countries in
Blanchflower and Oswald (l994b), With one exception, however, the quality of the data
sets, which are cross-sections with few years, is considerably lower than that available
here. The exception is the pooled CPSs for the USA. which give virtually identical results
(an unemployment elasticity of pay of approximately -0.09) to those derived in thispaper.
This similarity between the US and Great Britain raises interesting issues for future
research.D
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Table 1.Wage Curves for Great Britain 1973-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1973-1980 1981-1990 1973-1990
Ut -.0996 -.0697 -.1619 -.0927 -.1283 -.0822
(18.05) (4.41) (22.91) (2.79) (24.64) (6.23)
Regional dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Constant 1.9049 2.8946 3.4217 3.3408 2.7832 2.7543
(84.72) (90.46)(104.70) (51.19) (141.24) (91.86)
.7029 .7076 .6654 .6720 .7633 .7665
DF 96352 96332 79108 79098 175495 175485
F 4387.043240.782916.732534.60 7862.877028.98
N 96405 96405 79163 79163 175568 175568
Source: General Household Survey Series.
Notes: Unless statedotherwisethe following control variables were included: 1)9
industry dummies 2) 4 maritalstatus dummies3)15 highest qualification dummies
4)17 year dummies 5) gender dummy 6) experience andits square7)
part-time dummy 8)11 month of interviewdummies9) race dummy 10) 11 region
dummies interacted with dummy for years up to 1977.
The dependent variable is the natural log of gross weekly earnings. Ut is the natural log of
the regional unemployment rate. Unemployment is available for 11 regions by 18years.
t-statistics in parentheses.17
Table 2. Unemployment Elasticities from Disaggregated Wage Curves
Coefficient t-statistie N
All workers -.0822 6.23 175568
Male -.0935 6.41 96260
Female -.0742 3.28 79308
Black -.2291 3.09 5304
White -.0809 6.00 170265
Part-time -.0462 1.06 34945
Full-time -.0888 7.17 140623
Agriculture -.0713 0.63 3106
Energy and water .0097 0.14 4220
Extraction -.0709 1.45 7899
Metal goods, engineering etc. -.0554 2.10 24489
Other manufacturing -.1073 3.2! 21494
Construction -.1497 3.59 10696
Distribution -.0206 0.55 26295
Transport & communication .0000 0.00 11399
Banking, finance, insurance -.1277 2.27 11899
Otherservices -.0918 3.32 54074
Manufacturing -.0863 4.51 53881
Services -.0728 3.82 103665
Agec2Syrs. -.1329 5.09 34115
Age￿25butc5oyrs. -.0677 3.78 97629
Age￿5oyrs. -.0698 2.68 43815
ExperienceclOyrs. -.1164 4.86 42927
Experience 10-29 years -.0564 2.66 73557
Experience￿3Oyrs. -.0764 3.51 59084
No qualifications -.065 1 3.53 79070
O-Levelsetc. -.1155 4.93 57902
A-Levels .0003 0.01 12998
College -.0531 1.33 25598
Source: General Household Survey Series: Pooled 1973-1989.
The dependent variable is the log of weekly earnings. The same controls were used as
reported in Table 1, including 10 region dummies.18
Table 3.British Earnings Equations: Pooled GHS 1973-1990
Males Females Blacks
Logregional unemployment -.0935 (6.4) -.0742 (3.3) -.2290 (3.1)
Higherdegree .6396 (50.7) .8940 (25.5) .5806 (10.1)
1st degree. univ.diploma .5380 (86.9) .7943 (61.7) .6227 (19.9)
Teaching qualification .5510 (42.0) .9305 (71.8) .8771 (11.3)
HNC,HND,Tech. certificate .3353 (61.5) .5142 (28.8) .3032 (8.9)
Nursing qualification .2068(9.0) .5246 (45.8) .4115 (13.2)
GCE 'A'Ievel, ONC, OND. .2284(45.6) .3116 (28.3) .2547 (9.9)
OCE OleveIs-5 or more .1804 (38.1) .2104 (25.1) .1753 (7.0)
OCE'O'1-4,with clerical quals .1739 (&9) .1945 (18.4) .3273 (6.7)
GCEO'1-4,noclericalquals. .1053 (18.0) .1259 (13.9) .1021 (3.5)
Clerical&commercialquals. .1178 (6.3) .1291 (16.6) .1327 (3.6)
CSE .0326 (4.1) .0764 (6.0) .0940 (3.0)
Apprenticeship .0695 (14.5) .0023 (0.1) .1237 (2.2)
Any foreignqualifications .1757 (13.7) .1760 (8.3) .1298 (6.4)
Otherqualifications .1127 (13.6) .0967 (6.6) .1358 (2.8)
Years of schooling .0396 (29.1) .0292 (12.1) .0067 (2.3)
Black -.1452 (19.5) -.0186 (1.5) -
Manied .1959(49.1) -.0687(10.7) .1186(6.7)
Separated .1181 (10.1) -.0815 (5.8) .1173 (2.8)
Divorced .0949 (8.8) -.0793 (6.4) .0333 (0.8)
Widowed -.02 13 (3.2) -.056 1 (6.3) -.0245 (0.9)
Part-time -.8322 (103.8)-.9358 (209.0)-.8580 (40.8)
Male - . .3407 (24.7)
Experience .0489 (122.0) .0336 (54.5) .0324 (17.3)
Experience2 io3 -.8507 (115.3)-.5825 (48.8) -.5862 (15.0)
K2 .7589 .6953 .7435
N 96260 79308 5304
All equations include 11 month dummies, 10 region dummies, seventeen year dummies. 9 industry
dummies, 11 pre1978*region interactions, and a constant.
t-statistics in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the log of weekly earnings.19
Table 4.5% Disaggregations 1973-1990
1.9%- 2.5% -.0120 7.5% - 7.9% -.1344
(1.38) (5.90)
2.7% - 3.0% -.0469 8.0% - 8.5% -.1336
(4.08) (5.40)
33% - 3.4% -.0511 8.6% - 9.2% -.1428
(3.99) (5.69)
3.5% - 3.8% -.0598 9.3% - 10.2% -.1585
(4.50) (195)
3.9% - 4.1% -.0547 10.3% - 113% -.1744
(3.66) (6.10)
4.2% - 4.4% -.0664 1L8% - 12.8% -.1877
(4.16) (6.14)
43% - 43% -.0816 13.0% - 13.5% -.2015
(5.08) (6.24)
4.9% - 14% -.0575 ￿ 13.6% -.2185
(3.21) (6.33)
5.6% - 18% -.0977
-F .7665
(4.90) DF 175467
19% - 6.6% -.0965 F 5765.26
(4.61) N 175568
6.8% - T4% -.1224
(5.73)
Source:General Household Survey Series
The dependent variable is the log of weekly earnings.
The Table corresponds to the points on Figure 1.20
Table5. The BritishWageCurve Using Cell Means: 1973-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ut -.0385 -.1015 -.0192 -.0819 -.1215 -
(1.61) (3.65) (0.77) (2.54) (2.44)
Ut-i - - - - i-.0487 -.0380
(1.04) (1.23)
wt..1 - - .2382 .0615 .0707 .0745
(3.45) (0.89) (1.01) (1.04)
Regional dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.2407 5.8528 5.1973 5.6442 5.6326 5.4350
(7.03) (6.59) (5.26) (5.58) (5.57) (5.27)
.9972 .9980 .9969 .9976 .9976 .9975
F 989.69 1234.08 839.76 946.40 935.66 904.55
DF 126 116 115 105 104 105 N 198 198 187 187 187 187
Source: General Household Survey Series.
Notes:The following control variables wereincluded, allofwhich were cell means: 1) 9
industryvariables 2) 4 marital status variables 3)15 qualification variables 4)17year
dummies 5) gender 6) experience and its square 7) pan-time 8)11 month of interview
variables 9) race variable 10) 11 region dummies interacted with dummy foryears up to 1977.
The dependent variable, w, is the natural log ofgross earnings in the relevant year/region
cell. Ut is the natural log of the regional unemployment rate.
t-statistics in parentheses.21
Table 6.Further Results Using Cell Means: 1973-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ut - - - - -.0824 -.1209
(2.54) (2.42) Ut-i - - - - - ÷.0475
(1.01) -.2117 -.2013 -.1349 -.0707 -.0900 -.0746
(1.02) (1.01) (0.65) (0.34) (0.44) (0.36)
wt..1 - - .2474 .0957 .0635 .0721
(3.56) (1.36) (1.91) (1.02)
Regional dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 6.5628 6.0869 5.4261 5.6576 6.0135 5.9756
(6.97) (6.13) (5.36) (5.14) (5.55) (5.52)
.9972 .9978 .9969 .9974 .9976 .9976 F 977.59 1116.36 838.47 892.65 927.66 916.67
DF 126 116 115 105 104 105
N 198 198 187 187 187 187
Source: General Household Survey Series.
Notes: The following control variables were included, all of which were cell means: 1) 9
industry variables 2) 4 marital status variables 3)15 qualification variables 4)17year
dummies 5) gender 6) experience and its square 7) part-time 8)11 month of interview
variables 9) race variable 10) 11 region dummies interacted with dummy foryears up to 1977.
The dependent variable, wt. is the natural log of gross earnings in the
relevant year/region celL Ut is the natural log of the regional unemployment
rate. Pt is the natural log of the labour force participation rate.
t-statistics in parentheses.22
Table. 7The British Wage Curve: Sub-sample 1973-1977
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weekly Earnings Hourly Earnings
Ut -.0704 -.0895 -.0796 -.0876
(10.47) (4.83) (12.72) (5.08)
Regional dummies No Yes No Yes
Constant 2.8902 2.9221 -.7634 -.7430
(74.01) (63.04) (20.79) (17.10)
.5984 .6011 .4345 .4382
DF 60486 60476 60186 60176
F 1158.21 1038.12 594.73 535.12
Source: General Household Survey Series.
Inallcases there are 60,565 observations. Unless stated otherwise the following
control variables were included: 1) 24 industry dummies 2)11 regional dummies 3) 5
maritalstatus dummies 4)17 qualification dummies 5)18 occupation dummies 6) 4 year
dummies 7) gender dummy 8) experience and its square 9) part-time dummy.
Ut is the log of the regional unemployment rate.
t-statistics in parentheses.23
Appendix
The paper is concerned with the statistical fact that a downward slopingwage curve is
observed in the General Household Surveys. The purpose of this Appendix is, as an
illustration,todiscuss briefly one model (developedmorefully in Blanchflower and
Oswald (1994a)) that makes the correct prediction about the correlation found in the data.
An intuitive but misleading objection to the empirical results is that thewage-
unemployment correlation should -- by an argument based on compensating differentials --
be positive rather than negative. This is the criticism that we encountered most frequently
in seminar presentations in the US. A milder version of such a view is that, at best, the
estimated wage curves are likely to be a mixture of downward- and upward-sloping
functions, so that there is an unresolved simultaneity problem. According to this point of
view, the estimates conflate the positive Harris-Todaro gradient and the negative gradient of
a new-style macroeconomic model such as efficiency wage theory.
This Appendix sets out a model in which a downward sloping wage curve is
derived from optimizing behaviour. The reason for the negative gradient is that
unemployment frightens workers and, in consequence, firms find that in recessions it is
feasible to pay their employees less well. The model is constructed in a way in which,
contrary to Harris and Todaro (1970). wages and unemployment are inversely related.
The theoretical framework allows workers to migrate across regions. but assumes
that it is costly to do so. Hence unemployed individuals do not immediately attempt to
migrate: they migrate only if one region offers a better expected utility than another. This
realistic assumption of costly, rational, far-sighted migration decisions is important. It
effectively de-couples current pay and current unemployment, and so by-passes the-
positive gradient of the Harris-Todaro relationship. A high wage in the current period need
not be accompanied by high unemployment; pay and unemployment are positively related
only, put loosely, in expected or permanent terms. One version of the model goes further:
it shows that regions that differ only in non-pecuniary attractions may have the same wage24
curve and nothing that corresponds to a visible positive wage-unemployment relationship.
This is possible, for example, if one region is inherently attractive and, to ensure
consistency with a zero-migration equilibrium, therefore offers both low pay and high
unemployment. The other region pays well and has low unemployment, and is inherently
unattractive. The result is a negatively-inclined wage function even in long-run
equilibrium.
Consider an economy consisting of just two regions (this is inessential). The
following assumptions are made about region 1, and, with small modifications, about
region 2.
A. 1Assume that workers are risk-neutral, and get utility from income and disutility
from effort. Define the wage as wand the level of on-the-job effort as e. Assume
that utility equals the difference between income and effort, so that (pecuniary)
utility is
u =w-e.
A.2 Assume that effort at work, e, is a fixed number determined by technology, but that
individual employees can decide to 'shirk' and exert zero effort. If undetected by
the firm, these individuals earn wage w and have e =0,so that u =w.They are
then better off than employees who provide èfforL
A.3 An individual who shirks runs the risk of being detected. Designate as S the
probability of successfully shirking, that is. of escaping detection. Assume that
anyone caught shirking is fired, and has then to find work elsewhere (at required
effort e). Let the expected utility of a fired worker be W.Defineit
W=(w-e)cz(IJ)+b[1 -a(U)].
This is a convex combination of w -e,the utility from working at the required
effort level, and of b, which is defined as the income value of unemployment
benefit plus leisure. The function cx (U) measures the probability of finding work,25
and how that is affected by the levelof unemployment, U. prevailing in the local
labourmarket.
AAAssume that there is a constantrateof break-up,r.of firms. In steady-state
equilibrium,totalnewhiresinthelocal economyare a [1-n],where 1 is
populationandnisemployment, and
rn=ct[l-n].
Unemploymentis U 1 -nil,SO
r= k-a.





Thus the probability of finding a job, a, is a convex function of unemployment. U.
A.5Equivalent conditions hold in the second region. The wage them is 0 and the level
of unemployment benefit is .Theunemployment rate in the second region is .
A.6The second region differs from the first in that both workers and non-workers
enjoy a non-pecuniary benefit, $,fromliving in the region. Their utility is thus
u =o-ei- when working, arid u = + when unemployed.
A.7Each region is affected by shocks to the demand for labour. The shock variable is
denoted s in region 1. with a density function g(s). The shock variable in region 2
is a, with density of h(a).
A.8Workers are free, between periods, to choose to live in whichever region they.
prefer. They cannot migrate during a period.
The assumptions given above describe a form of efficiency-wage model. The
model's key characteristic is that employers must pay a wage that is sufficently high to
induce employees not to shirk. In equilibrium, workers must be behaving optimally in26
their effort decisions, and firms must be behaving optimally in their wage-setting. Regions
differ in theft non-pecuniary attractions: one of the two is a nicer place to live than the
other. Excludingdegenerateequilibria, however, each region must offer workers the same
level of expected utility. This condition defines a zero-migration equilibrium.
A number of results can be proved. Only one is reproduced here.
Proposition 1.
Eachregion has a downward slopingconvexwage curve. if both regions
have the same level of unemployment benefit (so b = /3), they have a
common wage curve given by the equation:
W=+b+(ls)[a(U)I•
Proofof Proposition 1.
For a no-shirking equilibrium, the expected utility from not shirking must equal that
from shirking. Thus in region I
w-e =8w+(i -5){(w-e)cz(tJ)÷b[l -a(U)J), (1)
which simplifies, after manipulation, to
w=e+b+( -8)[i-a(U)} (2)
In region 2, in which individuals receive a utility supplement .theno-shirking
condition is
-e+= 8()+(l-8){(w-e44)c4uH÷4Il.au)})(3)
The terms cancel from both sides, leaving a wage equation
(4)
If b =(, equation(2) is identical to equation (4), and the two regions have the same
wage equation. The convexity of this wage curve follows from the convexity of the a(U)
function and can be checked by differentiation. A region with a higher level of
unemployment benefit will have a (vertically) higher curve, as in Figure A. 1.27
Within this framework, contemporaneous wages and unemployment are negatively
related by a no-shirking condition. Simultaneously an integraloverwages and an integral
overunemployment will --inthe spirit (but against the letter) of Harris and Todaro (1970)
--bepositively related. This is why the empirical finding of a wage curve need not he
inconsistent with the idea of compensating differentials across regions. A more formal








(Region H here has a higher level of unemployment benefit than Region I)
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